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The Impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme on 
Education In Zimbabwe
Rungano Jonas Zvobgo PhD (Edin)
The Impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) on Education in Zimbabwe____________________________
Abstract
This paper discusses the impact that the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) has had on the education system in 
Zimbabwe. It contrasts the racially based colonial education system with 
the democratic one introduced at independence. The paper then shows 
how the ESAP has adversely affected the quality of the democratic 
education introduced at independence. The effective re-incarnation of 
the previously discarded differential education system is explained in the 
process. The paper uses much historical data to bring out these 
phenomena.
Preamble
This paper gives an overview of developments in education in 
Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. This review is made against the 
background of the economic reforms instituted soon after independence 
and highlights the impact of economic policies on educational reform. 
The 1980’s was the period during which the crusade for educational 
reform took a front position in the government’s agenda for social and 
economic re-engineering. The paper highlights some of the significant 
achievements made during those years.
Secondly, the paper examines the factors responsible for the radical 
change in educational policy after 1991 and in particular the impact of 
the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme on Education. Change 
in education policy .is viewed, not as an isolated event but as part of a
Zvobgo R.J. 66
broader policy change in the social and economic spheres. The 
introduction of ESAP in 1991 is shown to have marked the end of the 
honeymoon period in social and economic reform and the beginning of 
difficult years to come.
The Historical Background
Formal western educational enterprise began in 1859 with the arrival of 
European missionaries at inyathi. More missionaries were to come 
accompanying Cecil John Rhodes in his crusade to colonise Africa. 
After the raising of the Union Jack at Fort Salisbury in 1890, more 
missionaries were to follow. Their primary mission was to evangelise 
the black people of this part of Southern Africa that was to become 
Rhodesia.
The defeat of the African inhabitants by the white settlers in the bitter 
1896 -  97 war, firmly established white rule. This environment provided 
missionaries with fertile ground for intensive evangelical work. Both the 
missionaries and the white settlers shared common goals and vision 
which were primarily to establish and consolidate white hegemony. The 
repressive and exploitative tendencies of colonial rule were justified in 
terms of their role in supporting the christianisation of this part of Africa. 
Colonial administrators took advantage of missionary support for their 
exploits to plunder the colony’s resources including its people. The 
mission school was designed not only to facilitate the conversion of 
Africans to Christianity but also to produce a (iterate and useful 
functionary in the emerging white economy.
The curriculum in the mission school comprised the basic rudiments of 
literacy and numeracy as well as aspects of industrial training. The 
policy was to ensure that Africans were not educated or trained to a 
level where they became a threat to the white settlers. Prime Minister 
Godfrey Huggins (1933 -  52) explained this position quite clearly thus:
The European in this country can be likened to an 
island of whites in a sea o f blacks with the artisan 
and the tradesman forming the shores and the 
professional classes the highlands in the centre.
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Is the native to be allowed to erode away the 
shores and gradually attack the highlands? To do 
so would mean that the leaven of civilisation 
would be removed in this country (Gray, 1960, p.
236)
This perception of white/black relations was the cornerstone of the 
philosophy of separate and unequal racial development for which 
Huggins was better known and it laid the foundations of educational 
policy. It was a policy that was designed to ensure that Africans and 
Europeans lived and developed apart from each other. In Huggins’s 
own words, this policy visualised the two races -
—  living side by side yet apart. Each working in 
his own area, not in competition with each other 
but complementary to one another as in 
partnership (United Party, 1940).
In line with this philosophy, two separate systems of education were 
created; one for Africans and the other one for whites. The curriculum 
for white education was designed to impart superior skills and 
knowledge while that for Africans was meant to produce an inferior 
second-class citizen who would be a source of cheap labour. 
Keigwin,(1920) an administrator in the Department of Native Affairs tried 
to allay white fears that colonial and missionary policies on African 
education threatened white security.
If a critic feels that this education plan will be 
imperilling both his and the country’s labour supply, 
he should feel assured that our policy, far from 
decreasing the supply o f labour, should increase it 
both in quality and efficiency and develop simple 
skills in industries that do not open direct competition 
to Europeans (Keigwin, 1920; p. 178).
The policy of two separate systems of education, one for blacks and the 
other for whites remained in force throughout the history of colonial rule. 
During the first fifty years of white rule, African education was left almost
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entirely to the enterprise of missionary churches, while European 
education was largely the responsibility of government. It was not until 
1939 that secondary education became available for Africans at the 
Anglican mission school of St Augustine near the eastern town of 
Umtali. Europeans, on the other hand, had long accessed secondary 
education at several government schools in both urban and rural areas. 
It was only in 1948 that the first government secondary school for 
Africans was established at Goromonzi outside the country’s capital 
town of Salisbury (now Harare).
The result of limited opportunities in the African education sector was 
the tow retention rate of pupils between the first year of schooling Sub 
Standard A (primary) and Form IV (Senior Secondary). Between 1947 
and 1960, the following was the trend in school enrolment reduction.
TABLE 1
Wastage in African Schools between 1947 and 1960
Wastaae
Year PuDils
Sub A 1947 81 821 -
Standard II 1950 23 336 58 455
Standard VI 1954 4 429 18 937
Form II 1956 1 888 2 541
Form IV 1958 379 1 509
Form VI 1960 15 364
Source: Keatly, (1963). Politics of Partership: The Federation o f 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Penguin African Library p. 372
Of the 81 821 pupils who enrolled in Sub-Standard A in 1947, only 4 429 
reached Standard 6 which means that by 1954, 77 392 had dropped out 
during primary schooling.
Of the 1 888 who reached Form II (Junior Secondary) only 379 got to 
Form IV while a mere 15 reached Form VI (Advanced Level). Put in 
another way, out of the estimated 85% of African children who entered
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primary school in 1947, only 1% reached the tenth year of schooling in 
1960.
Disparities in the provision of educational opportunities for Africans and 
Europeans were glaring. A comparison of the retention rate in African 
and European education shows this clearly.
TABLE 2
Retention Rates in African and European Schools in 1956
Grade
Enrolment %
African Enrolment % European
Non Govt Govt
Sub A and B 56.74 (43.03) 25.6
Standard I 16.83 (13.96) 10.6
Standard II 10.92 (11.68) 10.3
Standard III 7.50 (8.19) 9.2
Standard IV 3.41 (7.71) 8.5
Standard V 2.17 (4.64) 8.3
Standard VI 1.38 (2.97) 7.3
Form I 0.54 (2.73) 5.7
Form II 0.37 (2.03) 4.0
Form III 0.12 (2.25) 1.6
Form IV 0.01 (0.68) 0.3
Form V None (0.21)
NB: Percentages are of the total enrolment and not enrolment potential, 
percentages in parenthesis are from Africans in a handful of government 
schools. European schools number from Standard V to Form VI. This 
table has transposed these grades to the approximate African 
equivalent, which included standard VI and excluded Form VI.
Source: Frank (1960). Race and Nationalism -  The Struggle for 
power in Southern Rhodesia Fordhan University Press. New York p. 
123
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What the table shows is that the large African enrolment percentage of 
56.74% registered in Sub-Standard A and B in 1956 drastically fell to
1.38% in non-government schools and from 43.02% in African 
government schools to 2.9% by the time the pupils reached Standard VI. 
The attrition rate in European schools in the same grades was more 
gradual falling from 25.6% to 7.3%. Similarly the enrolment percentages 
in African non-govemment secondary schools fell from 0.54 to 0.01 and 
2.73 to 0.21 for those African pupils in government schools. In 
European schools the fall was again much more gradual from 5.7% to 
0.3%. Considered against the wide disparity between the black and 
white child population, the differences were significant.
This situation of racial discrimination was intensified during successive 
colonial regimes in all sectors of education and training. In 1962, for 
example, out of a total of 436 apprentices country-wide only 10 were 
Africans. Records also show that in 1963, out of 317 apprentices, only 9 
were Africans. The following table shows this phenomenon clearly.
TABLE 3
Number o f Trainees in Various 
1962
Apprenticeship Courses by Race in
Industry EuroDeans Africans
Aircraft 28 3
Building 29 4
Engineering 263 4
Mining 98 1
Motor Trade 193 22
Printing 120 -
Railways 84 18
Total 915 52
Source: Reginald, (1975). Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa -  
Rhodesia UNESCO Press, Paris, p. 49
As can be seen, African apprentices were substantially out numbered by 
the whites in every industry. This clearly demonstrates that the majority
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of Africans did not have access to training. In fact, employment figures 
for 1962 showed that in the mining industry, 70% of the African labour 
force had no formal apprenticeship skills and 22% were semi-skilled. 
Only 8% were in staff or pensionable jobs. In the manufacturing 
industries, 87% were unskilled, 10% were semi-skilled, 35% were skilled 
and none were in staff jobs.
This African/European divide reached its peak during the reign of Ian 
Smith who sought to systematically restrict African advancement in all 
sectors of education and training. The Smith regime set out to reduce 
as much of government support for African education as possible. 
Under the so-called Community Development policy, all aspects of 
African development including education and health became the 
responsibility of local governments. These were run by African Councils 
under the titular authority of the Chief.
Local governments suffered several disadvantages. Firstly, their 
resource base was small since they could not tax their people. All tax 
went to Central Government treasury. In fact the main source of 
revenue for local governments was from the sale of beer at several beer 
hall outlets. Secondly, rural councils did not have adequately trained 
personnel to efficiently administer their affairs. The short training 
programmes offered at Domboshawa Training Centre were limited in 
purpose and scope.
Thirdly, these councils lacked political power and control over their 
affairs, after all, the Chief who bore ultimate authority over all decisions 
of Council was a government appointee who received a salary from 
central government. In short, local Councils could not make critical 
decisions without the prior approval of central government. They relied 
on the patronage of the white central government and handouts from 
treasury. These constraints undermined the ability of Councils to 
provide adequate health, education and social welfare services. The 
whole concept of community development was a form of apartheid, 
which crippled African development by denying it vital services and 
critical resources from central government. On the contrary, all aspects 
of European welfare and development were funded by the central 
government (Zvobgo, 1980).
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In the sphere of African education, the impact of this racist policy was 
evident in the limited facilities and opportunities available for Africans 
especially at the secondary level. The net result was the sharp drop out 
rate, which is seen, in the following table:
TABLE 4
Student A ttrition  rate in African Academic Secondary Schools 1966 
-1971
Year Form Enrolment Drop Out Rate (in
figures)
Over Proceeding Year
1966 I 6 137 -
1968 III 2 062 3 959
1970 Lower VI 187 1 780
Source: Composed from Reports of the Secretary fo r African
Education fo r 1966, p. 18 Table 6 (a), 1968, p.24 Table 6a, 1970 p. 25 
Table 6(a)
Taking the 1966 Form I enrolment as 100% the table shows that in 1968 
only 33.6% of the original 1966 form I enrolment of 6 137 reached Form 
III which is the transitional point from junior to senior secondary. Only 
3% of that Form I enrolment reached Lower VI, which is also the point of 
transition from senior secondary to High School Certificate, in fact only 
2.9% obtained a full six-year secondary education. It was these blatant 
inequalities which made drastic education reform imperative at the 
attainment of independence.
Transformation o f Education in the Post Colonial Period
Considered in the context of the developments we have seen in African 
education, the reform process that was triggered by the achievement of 
independence in 1980 was a reaction by the black majority government 
against the policies of previous governments and the structures set up 
to govern education during those regimes. Indeed, discrimination in
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education was one of the major reasons for which the armed liberation 
struggle was waged in the 1970’s.(ZANU PF Manifesto, 1980).
It is not surprising therefore, that in the post 1980 period, Zimbabwe saw 
radical changes in educational policy. Firstly, the racial structures in 
education were abolished. The two formerly separate' systems of 
education were integrated into a single non-racial system. The de- 
racialisation and democratisation of education were two of the most 
profound reforms in the new Zimbabwe. Educational restructuring was 
considered the cornerstone of political, economic and social reform, it 
was not only education, which experienced drastic changes. Health 
services as well as other basic social services were aiso subjected to 
major reforms. In the sphere of health, all hospitals and other medical 
facilities were de-racialised thereby giving Africans access to medical 
care in previously exclusively white medical institutions. In the tourism 
sector, all tourist facilities were de-racialised. The tourism industry, itself 
a former white preserve, became open to African entrepreneurs (The 
author witnessed Blacks acquiring formerly White-owned hotels). .
One of the areas that had given whites racial superiority and control of 
the economy and government was education, it is in this sphere that 
the most dramatic reform initiatives took place with the most remarkable 
achievements being , made in the first decade of independence. The 
following were some of the Indicators of this success.
I. Between 1979 and March 1992, the number of primary schools in 
the country increased by 189.5% from 2401 to 4549.
II. Primary school enrolment rose from 819200 to 2.4 million a three 
. fold increase.
III. The number of primary school teachers rose by 210 % from 28 
455 in 1979 to 59874 in 1992 (Zvobgo 1999).
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It was not only in the sphere of primary education that achievements 
were made. Similar successes were made in the secondary sector for 
example:
I. Between 1979 and 1992, the number of secondary schools 
increased from a mere 177 to 1517 a rise of 857%.
II. Enrolment rose from 66215 to 687742 a 1038% increase.
III. The number of teachers increased by 700% from 3730 to 25729 
(Lind, 1994, p. 22)
Much of this expansion took place in rural areas where, prior to 
independence, fewer secondary schools existed for example, in that 
period, government built 70 rural day secondary schools with at least 
one such school in each of the country’s 55 districts. The rest of the 
secondary schools were built by the various responsible authorities such 
as district and rural councils, churches, commercial fanners, committees 
and others with some government financial support in the form of grants.
The growth of the secondary school sector was fuelled by the demand 
for Form 1 secondary places from the growing pool of primary school 
graduates. In 1985 as many as 85% of Grade 7 graduates were 
enrolled for Form 1. By 1990, this demand had dropped to about 70% 
of those who completed Grade 7 in 1989 (Zvobgo, 1999). This was 
largely the result of the increasing failure by many parents to meet the 
ever-increasing costs of secondary education.
At tertiary level, the trend was similar. In Technical and Vocational 
colleges enrolment rose from 3469 to 9261 while in teachers colleges, 
student numbers increased from 2824 to 16576. At the then only state 
university, University of Zimbabwe enrolment increased from 2200 to 
9017 in the same period (Zvobgo 1999).
But it was not only from the point of view of increased numbers of 
people who gained access to education that the impact of post-colonial 
educational policy is remembered. There were other far-reaching 
outcomes of this reform initiative. A wide range of innovative teaching
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strategies were developed and implemented in order to improve the 
quality of education. The improvement of teacher training was one such 
strategy.
Faced with the escalating increase in primary school enrolments, 
government introduced in 1980, a new teacher primary education code 
named ZINTEC, the Zimbabwe Integrated National Teacher Education 
Course. This programme had its origins in the liberation war camps 
schools in Mozambique where the war situation required innovative 
strategies to deal with education in crisis situations. The philosophy of 
the Zintec programme was to integrate theory with practice and learning 
with work. The student teacher spent a third of the training duration at 
college learning the theories of the profession and two thirds of the time 
as a full time classroom practitioner under the close supervision and 
monitoring by field lecturers, senior school teachers and Heads of 
Schools. This strategy assisted in reducing the problem of teacher 
shortages in primary schools. This method of training was so successful 
that even the conventional teacher training colleges for both primary and 
secondary teachers embraced many aspects of the Zintec programme. 
The Zintecisation of teacher education represented one of the most 
significant reform initiatives in postcolonial educational reform in 
Zimbabwe.
Both the conventional teacher education institutions and the University 
of Zimbabwe to which they were associated, responded to the needs of 
the education system with urgency. The teacher education curriculum 
was revised so that it emphasised skills acquisition in order to speed up 
the production of competent teachers. Between 1981 and 1990, both 
the five Zintec colleges and the eleven conventional colleges in 
existence then produced over 10000 teachers (Zvobgo, 1999).
A second reform initiative was directed at teaching methodologies. This 
was done through the introduction of the Zimbabwe Science kit (Zim 
Science). This strategy was based on a philosophy of applying 
appropriate technology and equipment designed from locally available 
resources to teach natural sciences in those schools that had no 
electricity and conventional equipment. For the first time, rural children
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in underdeveloped areas were taught Physics, Chemistry and Biology 
using the kit.
A third strategy was the transformation of the Primary Education 
Development Unit (PEDU) and Secondary Education Development Unit, 
(SEDU) into a single unit called the Curriculum Development Unit 
(CDU). This integration brought together experienced manpower and 
critical financial and material resources, a move that significantly 
strengthened efforts to develop effectively new subject syllabuses as 
well as evaluation and monitoring mechanisms.
The Curriculum Development Unit made significant strides in developing 
and implementing new curriculum materials using specially trained 
subject experts. The result was the emergence of new teaching and 
learning materials specially suited to the needs of a new Zimbabwe in 
terms of content and cultural orientation.
To supervise the implementation of the new curriculum and ensure 
improved educational standards, a new schools inspectorate system 
was put in place. As principal of one of the ZINTEC colleges, the writer 
witnessed how the United National Children Educational Fund (UNICEF) 
and other donors such as the Swedish International Development 
Agency (SIDA) contributed significantly to this process by providing 
vehicles, learning and teaching equipment and other essential materials.
An additional reform initiative was the creation of the department of Non- 
formal and Adult Education to give adults and those out of the formal 
school system access to education. Significant strides were made in 
this area. Evening classes in both rural and urban areas were set up 
and their numbers increased from 56 in 1979 to 336 in 1990 while adult 
literacy went up from around 45% in 1980 to about 78% in 1990 
(Ministry of Education, 1991).
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The Impact of the Educational Reform Initiatives on Financial 
Resources and Government Expenditure on Education between 
1980 and 1990
The democratisation of education had considerable impact on state 
resources. Skyrocketing enrolments led to increased budgets as shown 
in table 5:
These costs seriously undermined the capacity of the economy to 
sustain education. During the first five years after independence, a 
number of reasons had encouraged government to invest huge 
resources in education. For example, Zimbabwe had become the 
destination for international aid and support.
TABLE 5
Government Expenditure on Education 1980-90
Year Budget Allocation in Zim Dollars %increase
over
______________________________________________ Previous year
1980 180 472 000 -
1981 209 070 000 16
1982 408 400 000 95
1983 416 805 000 2
1984 486 594 000 17
1986 674 969 000 39
1990 1 billion
48
Source: Compiled from the Reports of the Secretary for the-Ministry 
of Education, Sport and Culture for the years 1980 p. 17,1981 p.17, 
1982 p.18,1983 p .18 ,1984 p. 17,1986 p. 34,1990 p. 35.
Also, the democratic stance taken by the government in public affairs, 
supported by the policy of national reconciliation especially after a 
protracted and bitter-armed struggle against the Ian Smith regime,
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earned the government much international respect and support. 
International donor agencies were willing to assist the government in its 
economic and social development programmes. There were, therefore, 
high expectations that the country’s economic performance would 
improve.
Expected Performance of the Economy in the Context of the 
Prevailing Economic and Political Environment
There were high hopes that the attainment of independence and the end 
of the United Nationals sanctions would activate economic growth and 
revive the once resilient industrial base. It was believed that the country 
was poised for a re-energised economy, which would generate the 
much-needed financial resource support for government programmes. 
This belief was based on the following assumptions:
I. A  rise of 8% in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
anticipated between 1982 and 1985. The production of goods 
was expected to rise much faster than that of services.
II. The annual growth rate in wages was anticipated to rise by 3%. 
In fact Gross Fixed Capital rose from 19% realised in 1981/82 to 
28% in 1984/85 while domestic services were expected to rise 
from 11% of GDP in 1981/82 to 17% in 1984/85.
III. Rising employment levels were expected to raise capital 
consumption levels amongst Africans (Mandaza, 1987).
The euphoria of independence itself, increased public confidence in the 
future of the economy. This increased confidence in the economy was 
encouraged by the good rains of 1980/81 as well as the increased 
access to more quality land by more Africans. However, this confidence 
was short lived as economic conditions soon changed.
Actual Performance of the Economy
The actual performance of the economy was well below the'planned 
target for example:
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I. Between 1981 and 1982, the GDP registered a negative growth 
rate of 2% with a slight 3% recovery in 1983. In fact economic 
growth fell below the anticipated 8%.
II. Other service sectors showed a mere 4.2% growth rate and 1.4% 
for the material production sector (Mandaza, !987).
This fail in economic performance began to worsen during the second 
half of this decade as foreign investments began to dwindle. This was 
due to a number of factors such as:
I. The government’s continued Marxist/Leninist pronouncements 
and economic policies which began to threaten the profitability 
and viability of multi-national corporations. This resulted in 
reduced capital inflow into the country as well as a serious loss of 
friends amongst countries of the western block.
II. Anti-capitalist labour policies which reduced profitability and 
restrictions on the repatriation of profit earnings frightened 
investors,
III. Government monitory policies with their emphasis on increased 
spending on social services, increased the country’s foreign and 
domestic debt,
IV. Reduced capital inflows and growing foreign currency shortages 
began to undermine the economy’s capacity to generate 
resources needed to fund national programmes,
V. Reduced investments resulted in slow economic growth leading 
to job loses and loss of earnings.
VI. An unstable political environment arising from the Matebeleland 
civil war between former guerrillas of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the armed forces of Prime 
Minister Robert Mugabe's government made investment in this 
part of Zimbabwe both risky and difficult.
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VII. The net effect of this situation was low economic performance 
and growing failure by the government to sustain its social and 
economic reform programmes which were costing the state 
considerable resources. Education, in particular, proved to be 
one of the most expensive social services second only to defence 
(Zvobgo, 1999).
In addition to these high costs of education, health had its own demands 
as well. Rural hospitals and clinics were wholly funded by the state with 
medical services being dispensed free of cost to all rural people. All 
these and other social services benefits, which were provided freely to 
all, weighed heavily on state resources, in fact, in just under a decade, 
Zimbabwe was close to becoming a social welfare state.
As government's socialist oriented economic policies and 
pronouncements continued unabated, a disinvestment campaign by 
western governments and multi-national companies began to take their 
toll on the country’s economy. This was evident in the rapidly 
diminishing foreign currency reserves and increasing national debt. The 
resources available for social services also began to dwindle resulting in 
the weakening of the services themselves and the education sector like 
all other social services was gravely affected. The disinvestment rate of 
companies seeking relocation in Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Malawi and Zambia became clear warning signals of an economic crisis 
in the making.
As a consequence of these and other factors, there was a sharp decline 
in revenue. The rapid escalation on the balance of payments created 
conditions that made it difficult for government to fund national 
programmes. This was evident in the rise in the budget deficit from 
7.7% of GDP in 1981/82 to 10% in 1992/93. Xavier Khadhani reported 
that the debt service ratio stood at an estimated 30% in 1983 a 300% 
increase in three years from the 1980 levels yet this was the period of 
rapid social services expansion with education taking the lead. This 
performance was bound to impact negatively on the government’s ability 
to finance its programmes, the most costly of which were health and 
education. In fact a 3.8% economic growth rate was expected to 
support, apart from other social services, a 13% expansion in education.
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Under these conditions, education began to experience great difficulties 
and the gains made during the first five years of independence in 
improving citizens’ right of access to education started to suffer. An 
equally serious outcome of this economic situation for education was the 
difficulty in addressing issues of quality. Between 1985 and 1990, 
qualitative improvements became more and more difficult to pursue. 
Shrinking state resources compounded by reduced financial support for 
education by donor agencies and foreign governments, resulted in 
diminishing teaching and learning resources and a failing school 
supervision and inspectorate system. Constant breakdown of vehicles 
and the lack of spare parts, as well as increasing operational costs, 
began to take their toll on the quality of services the education system 
could offer.
In the classroom, the impact of recession and poor economic 
performance on teaching and learning was noticeable. Resources for 
teaching and learning became fewer as production costs began to 
skyrocket. Crowded classes and high teacher/pupi! ratios of 1:45 or 
more, began to affect teaching and learning standards. Also, poor 
conditions of service, mostly for rural teachers, led to low morale and 
high teacher turnover. These and other factors resulted in high pupil 
attrition rate. The system was beginning to weaken. A desk study on 
education in Zimbabwe carried out by Agneta Linda in 1994 revealed 
serious growing internal weaknesses in the education system. O f the 
376 032 pupils who enrolled in Grade One in 1980, 27% dropped out 
before reaching Grade Seven, most of them between Grade One and 
Two. This meant that these children left school before they had acquired 
any useful basic literacy and numeracy skills. In fact therefore, not all 
children completed their primary education as required by government. 
Of those who remained in school, 46% dropped out before reaching the 
first year of junior secondary education (Form One) while 54% dropped 
out before completing the second year (Form Two). A massive 67% 
dropped out before reaching the fourth year (Form Four or the Ordinary 
School Certificate Level). This also means that these pupils left school 
without attaining the Ordinary School Certificate, the basic minimum 
requirement for entering any professional training course in the country. 
To put it more dramatically, one out of every three pupils who entered 
primary school in 1981 reached Form Four. This works out to an
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internal efficiency rate of 33%. The Ordinary School level graduation 
rate amongst those who entered school in 1981 showed a much lower 
efficiency rate. Of the 409 000 students who sat for the Ordinary School 
Level examinations, less than 18 000 obtained the minimum five 
Ordinary Level passes. This represents only 4.4% of the pupils who 
started school eleven years earlier (Lind, 1994).
By 1985, serious internal weaknesses in the education system had 
become a cause for concern to all stakeholders.
The concerns included the following issues:
I. The lack of adequate support and planning for free education;
II. The lack of sufficient internal review mechanisms needed to 
reduce the levels of inefficiency;
III. The apparent failure by government to relate the education 
reform initiative plans to the available resources;
IV. The large numbers of children entering school without any 
financial contribution coming from parents and the impact of this 
policy on the quality of education the government could offer.
V. The very large numbers of untrained teachers with low academic 
qualifications was compromising the standard of teaching. 
Despite the significant contribution of the Zintec programme to 
teacher output, there was, in 1986, some 25 000 untrained 
teachers manning numerous schools. Many of them did not have 
an Ordinary Level School certificate and despite their large 
presence in schools, the teacher pupil ratio was as high as 1:45;
VI. The high staff turnover in rural schools due to poor living and 
working conditions meant that mostly desperate and under­
qualified teachers taught in those schools, and
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VII. Poor classroom furniture and the shortage of library and reading 
materials were undermining the quality of education schools 
could provide.
A sample of schools selected in Agneta Linda’s desk study revealed that 
only 18% of pupils were in classrooms that had a sufficient number of 
chairs and benches and only 12% of classrooms had enough desks for 
all pupils (Mandaza, 1987; p. 124). The policy of free primary education 
for all. had thus created serious problems and it became clear that 
government alone could not cope with the ever-escalating financial, 
human and material costs of an ever-growing system.
Achievements of the first Decade of Independence
Developments in education and other social sectors during this decade 
were not necessarily characterised by difficulties and shortcomings. 
Many achievements were realised for example:
I. A total of 2 674 821 children completed full seven years of 
primary education between 1980 and 1991.
II. 1 465 322 pupils went through two years of junior secondary 
education in the same period!
III. 954 864 students acquired four-year secondary education 
(Secretary for Education and Culture 1980 and 1991).
In the sphere of teacher training, available figures for 1987 to 1991, 
show that some 28089 primary school teachers and 54 739 secondary 
school teachers were trained.
These were certainly no mean achievements given the diverse social 
and economic areas, which called for government resources (Zvobgo, 
1999). Attempts to weigh these achievements, against the economic 
hardships they placed on government and the economy, have produced 
two interesting positions. Government critics argue that these same 
successes could have been achieved at less costs to the state had 
adequate and careful planning been put in place. The absence of
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alternative strategies for financing education is considered to have been 
responsible for the soaring budget costs of education leading to serious 
over-expenditures in this sector. It is also argued that high costs, 
incurred in education, were not translated into tangible economic 
benefits for the country.
Supporters of government policies on the other hand, argue that 
education, as a basic human right, cannot be denied to any citizen and 
therefore the costs incurred in liberalising education were morally, 
politically and socially justifiable. They further argue that it is the 
responsibility of government to develop its own people. Any attempt to 
sacrifice human development at the alter of financial austerity is 
therefore rejected. While this argument is laudable, there is no denying 
that better planning and management could have reduced some of the 
costs. The cumulative effects of the various reform initiatives introduced 
since independence on the state purse prompted government to review 
its policies.
The Advent of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) and its Impact on Education
The financial and material resource burden placed on the state by the 
government’s pro-socialist programmes weighed heavily on the fiscus. 
With the productive sector of the economy performing badly, and donor 
aid dwindling, government began to consider, seriously, the implications 
of continuing along the socialist route. A decision was reached in 1990, 
that the socialist ideological stance pursued by the state was creating 
serious economic problems. Government finally conceded that socialist 
orientation was not viable in Zimbabwe. Under pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, government agreed to 
strengthen the economy along the free market route. It was this 
decision, which brought about the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme. These international finance organisations, supported by 
western countries which fund them, notably Britain, and the United 
States of America, wanted a complete reform of the government 
economic policies. Government was presented with a number of 
preconditions for the renewed aid. These included the following:
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I. Economic liberalisation in order to allow increased participation of 
the private sector and other players;
II. Reduction of government's role in economic management;
III. Market forces to be the determinants on prices;
IV. Deregulation of the labour market to enable employers to hire 
and fire workers with limited restraint from government;
V. Introduction of cost recovery measures in education and the 
health sector;
VI. Making the private sector the engines for economic growth;
VII. Reduction of government control of parastatals to allow for their 
privatisation and commercialisation;
VIII. Reduction of the civil service in order to reduce government 
expenditure,
IX. Reduction of inflation through tight monetary policies;
X. Reduced spending and domestic and international borrowing; 
and
XI. Improvement of revenue collection leading to the creation of the 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (Zimbabwe, 1990).
Although the government claimed that the structural adjustment of the 
economy was a home brewed programme, the form it took, portrayed 
the hallmarks of IMF and World Bank prescriptions. These 
prescriptions, had disastrously failed elsewhere in the developing world 
notably in Jamaica, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia.
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The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 1991 -1 9 9 5
In compliance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank preconditions, a number of strategies were introduced to reform 
the economy. These were as follows:
I. Reduction of Central Government deficit from 10% of GDP to 5% 
by the fiscal year 1994-95;
II. Trade liberalisation in order to encourage investment inflow;
ill. Domestic deregulation in order to increase domestic competition 
and provide entrepreneurs with the freedom necessary to 
respond to emerging marketing opportunities and pressures;
IV. A sustained reduction in government spending through reduction 
of the civil service and reduced expenditure on social services 
through a cost-sharing arrangement with the beneficiaries. What 
this meant was that henceforth:
- There would be no free health services whether in urban or 
rural health institutions. Patients would have to share the 
costs of health services with government;
- There would be no more free primary education in rural and 
urban schools;
- Government schools would be allowed to supplement 
resources from Treasury by levying parents for various 
services offered by the schools;
- All educational institutions would institute cost-recovery 
measures in order to reduce the financial burden created by 
increasing costs,
- In addition, institutions would subcontract all non-core 
business to the private sector. This meant that services such 
as catering, cleaning, landscaping and security would no 
longer be the responsibility of the government (Zimbabwe 
Framework, 1990).
Private companies including those formed by retrenched civil servants 
were required to compete for these services through the open tender 
process. Schools would pay for these services using some government 
grants and funds generated locally through levies.
The Zimbabwe Bulletin of Teacher Education 87
The ESAP document statement on Education spelt out the anticipated 
impact of ESAP on education very clearly. The statement spelt out that 
the fiscal adjustment required of education would be considerably 
greater than that of the health sector. At independence, spending on 
education nearly doubled in one year (1981) thereafter, over the first 
decade, the annual growth rate of the budget was 10.3%. The Ministry 
of Education, Sports and Culture and the Ministry of Higher Education 
and Technology received about Z$1 532 million from treasury in 1989 
which was equivalent to about 10% of the GDP or about 18.5% of 
Central Government Spending. It was anticipated that by 1994/95 
government spending on education would be reduced by about 0.5% of 
GDP, that is, about 8.7% in real terms (World Bank Precis 105).
The assumption was that these reductions would enable government to 
direct the savings as direct investment particularly in the productive 
sectors of the economy and job creation. The development of the 
informal sector was considered crucial at a time when the formal sector 
was shrinking in size and productivity due to increasing economic 
hardships and disinvestment campaign by western countries.
These assumptions however, ignored the fundamental realities being 
faced by the Zimbabwean peasantry and working class people. Both 
groups were facing serious financial difficulties resulting from erratic 
rains, severe droughts and low crop production. In urban areas, 
increasing joblessness and growing closure of foreign as well as 
domestic companies reduced earnings available to the worker. This 
meant that the ability of the people to participate in cost sharing was 
severely eroded. Indeed, many children either dropped out of 
secondary education or, did not enroll in the first instance. Thus, the 
concept of cost sharing under ESAP was fraught with serious limitations 
and difficulties from the very beginning.
Initially, reduction in government spending on education was to be 
directed at those schools that received higher than average subsidies 
per student. This included former Group A, Trust and Mission 
secondary schools. In addition, 0.5% of GDP, the equivalent of Z$160 
million would be raised in 1994/95, through cost recovery measures 
directed on relatively well-endowed schools (World Bank Precis no.
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105). The system was structured in such a way as to relate to ability to 
pay. This means that a system of exemptions was to be introduced for 
those who could not pay. However, in the long run, the cost recovery 
programme became extremely painful as the costs to be borne by 
parents continued to increase.
Those schools that experienced high reductions in government support 
introduced a host of very high levies to make up for lost grants. The 
result was that a lot of African children dropped out of these schools and 
thereby inadvertently creating schools which were white Islands in a 
predominantly black society. ESAP began on very harsh note and 
although it was argued that the adjustment would be painful but short 
and would be economically viable, it proved to be long, slow and 
regressive. As already discussed, before the introduction of ESAP, 
education had enjoyed high budgetary allocation from Treasury. The 
introduction of ESAP changed the situation drastically, for example: the 
Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture’s vote for primary education 
dropped from $28.7 million in 1990 to $23,7 million in 1992. In fact, the 
overall plan was to reduce spending from the previous 24% of GDP in 
1989/90 to 18% in the 1990/91 fiscal year. In the following years, it 
would be at 19.5% in 1991/92,20.6% in 1993/94 and 20.7% in 1994/95. 
This would correspondingly represent 9.22% of GDP in 1990/91, 9.02% 
in 1991/92, 8.9% in 1992/93, 8.82% in 1993/94 and 8.72% in 1994/95 
(World Bank Precis No. 105).
These reductions were anticipated against new fee structures which 
would be introduced in education. The new fee rates were introduced 
under the 1991 Education Amendment Bill which revised the provisions 
of the 1987 Education Act, the legal basis for free education. The new 
A c t' authorised the introduction of fees in all urban primary and 
secondary schools and rural secondary schools. These were given as 
follows:
Table 6
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School fees and grants per student per type o f school (19991) in Z$
Type o f School Income from 
fees per child 
per annum
Income from  
grants per child 
per annum
Total income 
per ch ild  per 
annum
Urban Low 
Density Primary
210.00 8.00 218.00
Urban High 
Density Primary
60.00 12.00 72.00
Rural Primary 0.00 24.00 24.00
Urban Low
Density
Secondary
450.00 7.00 457.00
Urban High
Density
Secondary
210.00 10.00 220.00
Rural Secondary 150.00 20.00 170.00
Source: Bonsidge (1991). ESAP and Education fo r the Poor, Mambo 
Press, Gweru.
This amendment meant that:
I. All children in urban low density primary schools (Former Group A) 
were required to pay much higher fees than those in the high 
density (former African Townships) schools who were previously
' ' exempted but now also paid fees.
II. Rural primary children were still exempted (1991 Education 
Amendment Act).
III. All urban low-density secondary school pupils paid increased fees 
of up to $450.00 per year while their counterparts in high-density 
suburb schools paid a relatively lower figure of $210.00.
IV. Rural secondary pupils were not exempted despite the hardships 
encountered by rural parents. They were all required to pay 
$150.00 per annum.
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1 These were very high costs when it is considered that the average 
weekly wage for an African industrial worker was $250.00 while that for 
farm workers and mine workers was $75.00. These wages covered 
accommodation rentals, town council services, education, health, and 
groceries for an average family of six members. These workers made 
virtually no savings from their income. The majority of the rural 
peasants lived below the poverty datum line and were unable to meet 
the new fee levels. The result was that more and more parents found 
themselves unable to sustain their families. Consequently more and 
more urban children found themselves going back to rural schools to 
escape the hard economic conditions imposed by ESAP as parents tried 
to cushion themselves against the high cost of living. Rural parents 
were in a worse position, as there was no escape for them from the new 
fees. This situation was further worsened by more increases in fees, 
which were announced in May 1997. The new fee structure was as 
follows:
Table 7
Ministry of Education: New fees structure
Tuition fees per term
Category o f School 1996 1997 Incre
ment
%
P.l Primary Schools (Schools in Low 
Density Urban Areas) Zimbabwean Pupils $100 $19 90
Extra-Territorial Pupils US$465 $150 268
P.2 Primary Schools (Schools in High 
Density Urban Areas) Zimbabwean Pupils $35 $50 43
Extra-Territorial Pupils US$465 $150 268
P.3 Primary. Schools (Schools in Rural 
Areas) Zimbabwean Pupils Nil Nil
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Extra-Territorial Pupils US$465 $150 268
S.1 Secondary Schools (Schools in Low 
Density Urban Areas) Zimbabwean Pupils $210 $400 90
Extra-Territorial Pupils US$200 $650 351
S.2 Secondary Schools (Schools in High 
Density Urban Areas)
Zimbabwean Pupils
$150 $105 43
Extra-Territorial Pupils US$650 $200 351
S.3 Secondary Schools (Schools in Rural 
Areas) Zimbabwean Pupils 
Extra-Territorial Pupils
$60
$650
$75
US$2
00
25
352
BOARDING FEES PER SCHOOL TERM
All Primary 
Zimbabwe Pupils $665 $1 000 50
Extra-Territorial
Pupils
$1 320 US$200 73
All Secondary 
Zimbabwe Pupils
$800 $1 200 50
Extra-Territorial
Pupils
$1 410 US$250 102
Source: The Herald, 25 April, 1997.
NB: Fees in non-government schools are decided by the
responsible authorities but they must seek approval from the 
ministry before the increase is implemented.
In pursuit of what government believed to be cost recovery programme, 
fees went up by between 43% and 90%. Fees for rural secondary 
schools went up by 25% up from $60 to $75 per term. Although rural 
primary children were spared the hardships, fees for their counterparts
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in former Group B schools in high density suburbs went up by 43% 
whilst fees for those in former Group A schools were hiked by 30%. All 
this, was in addition to the increasing hardships caused by skyrocketing 
prices of basic food commodities (The Herald 25 April, 1997).
Although rural parents were exempted from paying primary school fees, 
this meant that rural primary schools depended on the annual 
government grant of $24 per child for their recurrent expenditure when 
in fact each child required at least $150. The results were disastrous. 
For example:
I. Children often learned under the open sky because classroom 
roofs could not be repaired. Where roofs existed, these were 
often leaking:
II. Basic text books were inadequate because of unavailability of 
money.
III. Resource centres and libraries were non-existent;
IV. Teachers’ houses were poorly constructed and maintained 
because of lack of adequate resources;
V. : There was no provision of funds from government for the
construction of new primary schools or the renovation of existing 
ones.
In the final analysis, rural children were getting a raw deal. All in all, 
ESAP brought about serious difficulties for parents who were unable to 
raise'fees for their children. Even those enrolled in better equipped 
urban or privately run schools met with serious hardships.
By 1992, there already was evidence of more and more students 
dropping out before sitting for examinations. Between 1990 and 1992, 
there was a 14% drop in the number of students sitting for ordinary level 
examinations compared with 12.5% between 1987 and 1989. In 1991, 
209 889 students registered for ordinary level examinations but in 1992 
only 180 000 registered. In 1992, 207 488 pupils were assisted with
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tuition fees and 15 462 with examination fees compared with 195 000 
arid 14 600 respectively in 1989. (Lind, 1994; p. 22).
Anthony Benridge, writing for Catholic sentinel community surveillance 
for monitoring the social dimension of ESAP, observed that the effects 
of ESAP on education were devastating. One of the main indicators of 
this crisis was the increased pupil dropout level in primary schools. A 
sample used in the research showed that only 83% of children aged 6 to 
12 years were going to school compared with 86% between 1987 - 89. 
The reasons which were cited were mainly financial. As a result of 
rising education costs and increasing poverty, enrolment at secondary 
school level fell by 10% between 1991 and 1993. High school 
examination fees compounded the situation.28 At Ordinary Level, 
examination fees in 1994, stood at $60.00 per subject. This meant that 
a student sitting for 5 subjects required $300.00 examination fees. In 
the majority of schools where students sat for 9 subjects, the fees 
amounted to $540.00. A 57% increase in ‘A’ level examination fees in 
February 1995 was a shock to many parents. The fees increased from 
$168 to $264 per subject. This meant that a student sitting for 3 
subjects required $792 plus $167 for the English General paper. In 
addition, a basic centre fee of $104 was required. All in all, one 
Advanced Level student required a total of $1 063.00. These fees were 
well beyond the reach of most parents (Benridge, 1994).
Private education experienced harsher conditions with costs and fees 
escalating to unprecedented levels. With the introduction of the cost 
recovery policy, most private schools began to charge an annual desk 
fee ranging between $20 000.00 and $40 000.00. This fee was not part 
of the general fees. In addition, several levies were charged despite the 
fact that no school was allowed to effect such levies without the 
approval of the Secretary for Education, Sport and Culture. These 
included science laboratory levy, hostel levy, sports levy, library levy and 
a host of others. In some of the private schools, the high fees were 
intended to restrict the number of African students seeking admission. 
However, even government schools also began to levy students 
although the levies have remained lower as a result of government 
control.
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Tertiary education has experienced a similar crisis. Technical and 
Teachers Training College students have seen tuition fees rise from $1 
600.00 per year in previous years to $17 000.00 in August 2001. 
University students have received an even greater shock. By 2002, their 
fees had risen from $1 600.00 to $25 000.00 per year for humanities 
and social science students, whilst natural science students have had 
their fees hiked to $30 000.00. Medical and engineering students have 
had their fees raised to $35 00.00 per year. Private universities charged 
as much as $200 000.00 per student per year. Despite nation-wide 
student demonstrations against this new fee structure, the government 
proceeded to implement it as part of its commitment to ESAP. The 
previous policy of charging low fees at tertiary level was therefore 
abandoned. Government also negotiated a new arrangement with a 
consortium of banks to provide loans to students beginning August the 
1st 2001. Under the arrangement, students are required to negotiate 
loans directly with the banks and their parents provide surety. Banks 
charge 10% interest annually on all loans and track down defaulters. In 
other words, government is no longer responsible for funding tertiary 
students although it provides guarantee for the money banks loan out to 
students in order to safe guard share holders investments. These fees 
have continued to escalate as institutions find it more and more 
expensive to secure provisions. It would be recommended that 
Government concentrates more on availing funds for students to borrow, 
and ensuring that the borrowed funds are returned. This would make the 
student funding programmes more self-sustaining.
The impact o f ESAP on education has therefore been devastating. As 
the economy continued to experience problems of viability, an attempt 
was made in 1996 to consolidate the few economic gains of ESAP. 
Government introduced a support programme called Zimbabwe 
Programme for Economic and Social Transformation -  Zimprest 1996 -  
2000. Some of its objectives were:
I. To restore macro-economic stability because without this stability, 
no meaningful socio-economic transformation was possible;
II. Further promote economic and social development and greater 
equity of both opportunities and outcomes;
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III. Promote greater decentralisation in order to encourage local 
responsibility and accountability and public participation in 
decisions about management of national resources;
IV. Promote indigenisation in order to economically empower the 
African masses;
V. Promote and exchange market liberalisation by allowing private 
business and individuals to have personal foreign currency 
banking accounts so that they can transact in foreign currency at 
market determined exchange rates;
VI. Allow Corporate foreign currency banking accounts which make it 
possible for exporters to retain their export proceeds;
VII. Licensing of foreign exchange bureaux and
VIII. Unification of official and inter bank market exchange rate 
(Zimbabwe, 2000; p. 3).
Zimprest, on the whole, was the strategy for improving and promoting 
the implementation of ESAP. It set out to do this by providing a 
timetable for the achievement of each task by each government 
ministry/department. Government officers were to police all 
departments in order to ensure that the outlined objectives were met.
The Ministry of Education was tasked to achieve the following:
I. Improve capacity utilisation and reduce running costs in the 
sector;
II. Rationalise central government structures and develop a 
comprehensive strategy for the decentralisation of management 
responsibilities to education institutions and local authorities;
III. Improve the relevance of education curricula to the economy and 
improve the employability of school leavers and graduates;
IV. Increase access to information technology at the school level;
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V. Improve access to education for disadvantaged groups, 
especially girls;
VI. Improve cost sharing strategies;
VII. Intensity efforts to improve early childhood learning facilities and
VIII. Provide adults with opportunities for life long education 
(Zimbabwe, 19996; p. 3).
Zimprest programme was an admission that ESAP had not performed 
as expected. In fact, the anticipated reduction in fiscal deficit of 5% of 
GDP by the end of the fiscal year 1994/95 was missed by a wide 
margin. The turn out was 13.5% of GDP. This was because persistent 
budgetary underperformance brought the country to the brink of a debt 
trap and economic collapse. Also, after 1998, the economy and all 
social service sectors suffered a major blow with the crush of the 
Zimbabwean dollar on the exchange market from 1 US dollar to 38 Zim 
dollars to 1 US dollar to 55 Zim. dollars. Apart from this, Zimbabwe’s 
involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s civil war and the 
payment of lump sum pensions of $50 000 plus monthly allowance of 
$2 000.00 to each of the 20 000 approved war veterans was 
unfavourably received by the country's aid donors principally the 
European union countries and the international finance organisations 
mainly as the IMF and the World Bank. This, and other factors such as 
the persistent decline in economic performance, worsened the economic 
crisis. What this meant for education was that:
I. School and college books, which were previously imported, were 
now more difficult to obtain due to acute shortages of foreign 
currency;
II. Equipment previously obtained from outside the country became 
• difficult to procure;
III. The Ministry of Education began to face extreme difficulties 
regarding the payment of students’ examination fees to 
Cambridge University due to the high foreign exchange rates and 
the total collapse of foreign currency reserves;
IV. Rising inflation and high commodity prices, created difficult living 
conditions for teachers many of whom began to leave the country
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for greener pastures in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and the 
United Kingdom. The obvious solution one would proffer in this 
scenario is saving money through reduction in military spending.
Increasing economic difficulties worsened government’s ability to fund 
the education system. As a result, the Junior Secondary School 
national examinations had to be scrapped largely because of the 
difficulties of finding the money to pay markers and meet other related 
costs. This meant that there was no longer an intermediate testing 
mechanism for children immediately after the Primary School Grade 7 
class and before the Ordinary Secondary School Certificate (Form 4), as 
was the case before. The economic crisis created by ESAP crippled all 
social services. The cumulative result of the problems created by ESAP 
was its abandonment by government. In June 2002, the then Deputy 
Minister for Information and Publicity in the President’s Office, Jonathan 
Moyo, described ESAP as an Albatross around the government’s neck. 
On July the 26th 2002, President Mugabe declared that ESAP was 
officially dead and that people were now free to get on with their lives 
(The Herald, 26 July, 2002).
The funding of education after the death of ESAP has shown an upturn 
and return to the Pre-ESAP spending pattern. The 2002 budget 
allocation announced on November the 1st showed a remarkable 
increase, once again in the Health and Education sectors. In the budget 
speech, the Minister of Finance and Economic Development Dr Simba 
Makoni conceded that government was now under extreme pressure to 
deal with increased poverty levels and serious health problems. As a 
result, health was allocated a record $22 billion up from $12 billion in 
2001. The Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture received $26 070 
950 000.00 whilst the Ministry of Higher Education and Technology 
received a record $11,5 billion. The Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare received an unprecedented $88,8 billion for the social services 
sector, which is 22.8% of government’s expenditure for 2002 (Budget 
Estimates 2002). Much of this money was also meant to assist poor 
students pay fees. In the 2003 budget, Education, Sport and Culture 
was allocated $56,971,634,000 while Higher Education and Tertiary 
Education received $14,497,248,000 (Budget Estimates 2003). Public 
spending is thus once again, skyrocketing in an environment of serious
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economic under performance in which revenue to the exchequer is 
rapidly dwindling and foreign aid has disappeared.
What is clear is that the claims by the IMF and the World Bank that 
ESAP would lead to the improvement in the country’s social and 
economic sectors have been proved wrong. On the contrary, poverty 
has worsened. Indicators of this situation are:
I. A failing economy that is seriously constrained by the lack of 
investment and foreign currency.
II. Social services that are in a state of disarray due to inadequate 
resources.
III. An education sector that is experiencing hardships as a result of 
dwindling economic resources.
IV. Health services that are at the point of collapse due to the lack of 
foreign currency needed to procure essential drugs and meet 
high operational costs.
V. Above all, deliberate sabotage of government programmes by 
some hard core members of the former white Rhodesian 
government supporters, who are critical of the present 
government; lack of support from the International Finance 
Organisations and countries of the western block which are 
protesting against the government’s agrarian reform programme.
The denial of international aid and support for Zimbabwe by the western 
governments and finance houses at this juncture, sprang from the fact 
that President Mugabe’s government refused to maintain the status quo 
with regard to land ownership rather than the alleged violations of 
human rights and absence of the rule of law.
Conclusion
In conclusion, a few recommendations are worthy considering. For 
Example; there is need, to develop and implement local solutions to 
local problems if the social service reform initiative undertaken since
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independence is to succeed. Perhaps ESAP should never have been 
implemented in its original form given the fact that its theoretical 
framework, assumptions and prescriptions were foreign and had already 
failed dismally elsewhere. ESAP was the one drug that nearly killed 
the patient. There, is however, need to liberalise the economy if 
economic recovery is to take place. The country needs now, more than 
ever before, to generate massive domestic investment. This can be 
achieved without compromising national sovereignty and independence. 
Countries like Malaysia have been able to do so. It is the only route to 
survival and politicians will have to develop the necessary 'acrobatics' to 
save the nation. Urgent measures need to be put in place by the 
government to restore the viability of the social services in particular, 
education and health, the agro-industries and the informal sectors of the 
economy. These are the bedrock for society’s survival. There is a limit 
to how far white resistance to economic reform can continue to be held 
responsible for the country’s economic misfortunes. Failure to restore 
public confidence in public systems and services can seriously 
endanger political stability. The country's development programmes will 
collapse if the education sector and its training institutions collapse and 
fail to train manpower critical for the economy. The absence of a viable 
health system can trigger a calamitous situation of unimaginable 
proportions while the collapse of the economy can spell doom for the 
nation. In future, serious 'surgical' analysis of externally brewed 
solutions to Zimbabwe’s problems needs to be undertaken before the 
solutions are adopted or tried.
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